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1. Introduction 28 
Firms in emerging markets such as China often have highly concentrated corporate ownership 29 
structures in which controlling shareholders frequently seek to extract private benefits at the expense of 30 
minority shareholders (i.e., the principal-principal problems) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 31 
1998). The limited protection of minority rights and low corporate transparency in Asia exacerbates the 32 
expropriation of minority shareholders (Claessens and Fan, 2002). 33 
Shareholders’ meetings and the board of directors are perhaps the two most important of all of the 34 
corporate governance mechanisms. Shareholder voting and board representation are an important means 35 
by which shareholders participate in corporate governance to protect their interests. In this study, we 36 
examine the determinants and effects of the voluntary adoption by China’s listed firms of a cumulative 37 
voting system (CVS), which is designed to give a degree of control to minority shareholders and increase 38 
minority shareholder representation on the boards.  39 
Before 2002, almost all of China’s listed firms used a straight voting system to elect their directors.1 40 
                                                        
1 China Vanke Co., Ltd (Stock ID: 000002) and Foshan Electrical and Lighting Co., Ltd. (Stock ID: 000541) adopted 
the CVS in 1988 and 2000, respectively. 
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Under this system, each shareholder votes according to the number of shares s/he owns for as many 41 
candidates as may be elected. If two directors are to be elected, the shareholder may vote dependent on 42 
the number of shares s/he owns for each of the two candidates. Under this procedure, a shareholder who 43 
owns a majority of the shares in a particular election can elect the entire board of directors. 44 
In 2002, the China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) introduced the Code of Corporate 45 
Governance for Listed Firms in China, which stipulated provisions for the protection of investors’ 46 
interests and rights, including the CVS. The CSRC required listed firms whose controlling shareholders 47 
hold over 30% of the total number of shares to adopt the CVS. In 2006, the CVS was incorporated into 48 
the newly amended Corporate Law.2 Under the CVS, each shareholder receives a block of votes equal 49 
to the number of shares s/he owns multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. The shareholder 50 
may then cast his entire block for a candidate or may distribute his votes among any number of candidates 51 
in whatever proportion s/he desires. Therefore, with the CVS it is possible for minority shareholders to 52 
elect one or more board members even if a controlling shareholder opposes their election (Bhagat and 53 
Brickley, 1984).  54 
The 2002 Code of Governance does not require firms whose controlling shareholders hold less than 55 
30% of the total number of shares to adopt the CVS. That is, the CVS is optional for these firms. However, 56 
between 2002 and 2005, 143 listed firms voluntarily adopted the CVS even though they did not meet the 57 
shareholding criteria.3 Using these firms as the unique sample, this paper examines the determinants and 58 
effects of voluntary adoption of the CVS. 59 
                                                        
2 We collected the data and found that more than 90% of listed firms adopted the CVS after 2006. 
3 For convenience, we refer to the firms that adopted the CVS during 2002-2005 as “CVS-adopting firms” and firms 
that did not adopt the CVS as “non-adopting firms”. 
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It is particularly important to identify corporate governance factors associated with voluntary CVS 60 
adoption to inform securities regulators of the demand for and (dis)incentives against CVS adoption. On 61 
the one hand, compared with firms with strong corporate governance, firms with weak corporate 62 
governance may be under greater regulatory pressure and minority shareholders in such firms have 63 
stronger desire to protect their benefits. If such pressure and desire are sufficiently high, it is likely for 64 
these firms to adopt the CVS. On the other hand, it is more likely for firms with strong corporate 65 
governance to adopt the CVS because monitoring agents like institutional investors (e.g., mutual funds) 66 
and independent directors may push them to adopt new corporate governance mechanisms. Identifying 67 
the corporate governance determinants of CVS adoption may assist regulators to gauge the likelihood of 68 
success of the CVS, any potential impediments or favorable factors, and the strategies necessary to make 69 
the system successful. Furthermore, by finding out whether the CVS is effective in protecting shareholder 70 
benefits and how it does, regulators can decide whether CVS adoption should be a mandatory 71 
requirement for all listed firms in China. It can also help minority investors to make appropriate 72 
investment decisions by focusing on CVS-adopting firms. 73 
To investigate the determinants of CVS adoption, we focus on corporate governance variables that 74 
potentially affect the voluntary adoption of the CVS. We find that firms with strong corporate governance 75 
(in terms of mutual funds ownership and board independence) are more likely to adopt the CVS.  76 
Adopting propensity score matching (PSM) and difference-in-differences (DID) analysis, we find 77 
that CVS adoption improves firm performance. Moreover, we explore the moderating factors that 78 
influence the positive association between CVS adoption and firm performance and find that this 79 
relationship becomes more significant for firms in a weak firm information environment, with less mutual 80 
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funds’ ownership, and whose managers have more power. 81 
Finally, we identify three channels – professionalism of board directors, controlling shareholders’ 82 
expropriation, and managerial entrenchment – through which CVS adoption affects firm performance. 83 
Our study differs from the prior studies in two ways. First, contrary to the findings of Xi and Chen 84 
(2014), Chen and Du (2015), and Chen et al. (2015), our study empirically demonstrates that CVS 85 
adoption can help curb the conflicts between controlling-minority shareholders and improve firm 86 
performance by increasing the number of directors with professional experience, mitigating controlling 87 
shareholders’ expropriation, and constraining managerial entrenchment. In this regard, our study enriches 88 
the literature on corporate governance in general and the literature on the principal-principal problems in 89 
particular. As the expropriation of minority shareholders is common in China’s listed firms, our findings 90 
are important to researchers and regulators interested in resolving the principal-principal problems.  91 
Second, contrary to Xi and Chen (2014), Chen and Du (2015), and Chen et al. (2015), we focus on 92 
voluntary CVS adoption during the period 2002-2005. Compared with compulsory adoption, voluntary 93 
adoption is more interesting as it shows what firms are likely to be the first movers and whether there are 94 
economic consequences of doing so. When examining the effects of CVS adoption, we combine the PSM 95 
and DID methods to address endogeneity issues arising from omitted unobservable variables and reverse 96 
causality. As an overwhelming majority of listed firms adopt the CVS from 2005 (Xi and Chen, 2014), 97 
examining the voluntary adoption of the CVS during 2002-2005 helps us find out an appropriate matched 98 
sample which did not voluntarily adopt the CVS during that period. 99 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the institutional background and 100 
discuss principal-principal problems in relation to the CVS in Section 2, develop hypotheses in Section 101 
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3, introduce the research design in Section 4, discuss the empirical results in Section 5, examine the 102 
moderating effects of firm information environment, mutual funds’ ownership, and managerial power in 103 
Section 6, and explore channels through which CVS adoption affects firm performance in Section 7. 104 
Section 8 concludes the paper. 105 
2. Institutional background 106 
2.1. Principal-principal problems in China’s listed firms 107 
Traditionally, agency theory focuses on the agency relationship and divergent interests between the 108 
principal and the agent in the context of diffused ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, 109 
emerging economies are characterized by dominant ownership (in the form of state ownership, family 110 
ownership, pyramid ownership, or a combination of these). Weak corporate governance structures, often 111 
found in emerging economies like China, potentially create severe principal-agent problems. High 112 
ownership concentration is seen as a way to alleviate such problems (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). However, 113 
dominant ownership, coupled with weak corporate governance and limited investor protection, nurtures 114 
a new set of agency problems: principal-principal problems. In such a setting, controlling shareholders 115 
are in a position to exert a great deal of influence on their companies’ operations, and obtain private 116 
benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders. In a concentrated ownership structure, 117 
corporate managers usually represent controlling shareholders and thus make the principal-principal 118 
problems more pronounced (Firth et al., 2011). 119 
China is one of the largest emerging markets, but its government still plays a decisive role in its 120 
economy. Government ownership is prevalent as most listed firms were previously state-owned 121 
enterprises (SOEs) whose largest shareholders are their parent groups, with further ownership stakes held 122 
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by government agencies. Minority tradable shares are mainly held by over 70 million individuals and 123 
mutual funds. Given that government agencies have effective control over all company decisions, 124 
corporate governance is not well established (Sun et al., 2013) and fraudulent activities are increased. 125 
Due to the lack of effective monitoring mechanisms, the controlling shareholders and the management 126 
usually possess excessive control over the company. This facilitates immoral behavior aimed at pursuing 127 
private gains rather than the best interests of the company and shareholders. Hence, the main agency 128 
problems become the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders. Indeed, 129 
previous studies have reported that large shareholders in China can extract cash by selling assets, goods, 130 
or services to the company through self-dealing transactions; obtaining loans on preferential terms; 131 
transferring company assets to other companies under their control; and diluting the interests of minority 132 
shareholders by acquiring additional shares at a preferential price (Wang, 2015). 133 
2.2. Adopting the CVS to protect the interests of minority shareholders 134 
Since 1997, the Chinese government has taken various measures to protect minority investors from 135 
controlling shareholders’ expropriation through a series of regulations.4 CVS adoption is one of the 136 
means to improve minority shareholder protection. In January 2002, the CSRC issued the Code of 137 
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China. Article 31 of this Code states that “the election 138 
of directors shall adequately reflect the opinions of minority shareholders and the CVS shall earnestly be 139 
promoted at the shareholders’ meeting to elect directors. Listed companies with a controlling shareholder 140 
owning more than 30 percent of the outstanding shares shall adopt the CVS.” It is the first time when 141 
Chinese regulators put forward the CVS in this Code. In 2006, the CVS was incorporated into the newly 142 
                                                        
4 See Jiang et al. (2010) for a detailed summary of regulatory reforms and policies. 
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amended China’s Corporate Law and recognized as a statutory rule. The Corporate Law (2006) sets out 143 
in Article 106 that when listed firms elect board directors or supervisory directors at shareholders’ 144 
meetings, they may adopt the CVS according to their articles of association or resolutions of shareholders’ 145 
meetings.  146 
La Porta et al. (2000) argue that granting more voting rights to minority shareholders can curb the 147 
expropriation from controlling shareholders. Under the CVS, minority shareholders can cast all of their 148 
voting rights for one or several of their favored candidates and increase their representation on the boards. 149 
For example, if an election is for two directors and a shareholder owns 200 shares (one vote per share). 150 
Under a straight voting system, the shareholder has a maximum of 200 shares for each candidate (and 151 
400 votes in total. With a CVS, all 400 votes could be cast for one candidate, or divided whichever way 152 
the shareholder chooses. Therefore, it is possible for minority shareholders to elect one or more board 153 
members even if a controlling shareholder opposes their election. 154 
The ability of minority shareholders to elect “representative” directors is particularly important in 155 
China. Although China has introduced independent directors to the board of directors and requires listed 156 
firms to establish supervisory boards, the available evidence on the effectiveness of their monitoring 157 
roles is mixed. Furthermore, China is a civil-law country where the legal protection of minority 158 
shareholders is weak (Chen et al., 2009). Private securities litigation (PSL) was not allowed until the 159 
promulgation of a specific PSL rule by the Supreme People’s Court in 2002, but the enforcement of this 160 
rule is often clouded by the dilemma of protecting listed SOEs and defrauded minority shareholders, and 161 
by the undue influence of local government in protecting local interests (Zou et al., 2008). In contrast, 162 
directors elected by the CVS to represent the minority shareholders have greater incentives to exercise 163 
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their rights. Minority representation on the boards may add independent critical scrutiny of controlling 164 
shareholders-dominated firms and sometimes presents a prior constraint on illegal behavior, thus 165 
enhancing the protection of minority shareholders (Feinerman, 2007). 166 
Moreover, concentrated ownership structures are common in Chinese firms, minority shareholders 167 
are always passive and usually do not attend shareholders’ meetings due to their limited shareholdings. 168 
Even if they attend and speak at meetings, controlling shareholders tend to ignore them. However, if a 169 
firm adopts the CVS, minority shareholders can elect “representative” directors and mitigate controlling 170 
shareholders’ expropriation. For example, Gree Electric Appliances, Inc. of Zhuhai, a listed Chinese firm 171 
(Stock ID: 000651), adopted the CVS to elect board directors at the shareholders’ meeting held in May 172 
2012. With the CVS, the minority shareholders, mainly institutional investors, elected their 173 
“representative” director and a candidate recommended by the controlling shareholders was voted out 174 
(Liu, 2012). This greatly encourages minority shareholders, especially institutional investors, to actively 175 
take part in the corporate governance of listed companies. 176 
3. Hypotheses development 177 
3.1. The competing hypotheses on the corporate governance determinants of CVS adoption 178 
China’s listed firms usually have concentrated ownership structure. Controlling shareholders and the 179 
management often possess excessive control over the company and seek to extract private benefits at the 180 
expense of minority shareholders. CVS seems an effective corporate governance mechanism to protect 181 
minority shareholders. With the CVS it is possible for minority shareholders to elect their ‘representative’ 182 
directors even if controlling shareholder opposes their election. Minority representation on the boards 183 
may add independent critical scrutiny of the controlling shareholder and improve the protection of 184 
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minority shareholders. 185 
On the one hand, the CSRC has made great efforts to improve the corporate governance of listed 186 
firms by issuing the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China in 2002 and requiring 187 
listed firms to comply with the Code. Accordingly, compared with firms with strong corporate 188 
governance, firms with weak corporate governance may suffer more regulatory pressure. Meanwhile, 189 
minority shareholders in firms with weak corporate governance may have stronger desire to protect their 190 
benefits. As CVS adoption may increase minority shareholder monitoring and curb controlling 191 
shareholder entrenchment, it is more likely for firms with weak corporate governance to adopt the CVS 192 
so that they can benefit more from an earlier adoption. 193 
On the other hand, it is more likely for firms with strong corporate governance to adopt the CVS 194 
because they may be pushed by such monitoring agents as institutional investors (e.g., mutual funds) and 195 
independent directors to adopt new corporate governance mechanisms. This is plausible because under 196 
the CVS minority shareholders can elect their “representative” directors to mitigate controlling 197 
shareholders’ expropriation or managerial entrenchment. 198 
Therefore, we propose two competing hypotheses relating to the corporate governance determinants 199 
of CVS adoption: 200 
H1a: Ceteris paribus, firms with weak corporate governance are more likely to adopt the CVS. 201 
H1b: Ceteris paribus, firms with strong corporate governance are more likely to adopt the CVS. 202 
3.2. The hypothesis on the impact of CVS adoption on firm performance 203 
We then explore the impact of CVS adoption on financial performance. Agency theory (Jensen and 204 
Meckling, 1976) suggests that a better-governed firm should have better performance and a higher 205 
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valuation due to lower agency costs. This prediction is supported by many empirical studies. For example, 206 
Brown and Caylor (2006) find that better-governed U.S. firms have a higher return on equity, a higher 207 
return on assets, and higher Tobin’s Q. Sami et al. (2011) find a positive relationship between corporate 208 
governance and firm performance.  209 
The objective of the CVS is to improve the protection of minority shareholders by increasing minority 210 
representation on the boards and monitoring and alleviating controlling shareholders’ expropriation and 211 
managerial entrenchment. To the extent that CVS adoption improves corporate governance, and 212 
ultimately, firm performance, we expect the CVS-adopting firms to outperform the control firms. Hence, 213 
we hypothesize:  214 
H2: Ceteris paribus, CVS-adopting firms have better performance than non-adopting firms. 215 
4. Research design 216 
4.1. Sample selection 217 
Our sample initially comprised all companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 218 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2002 and 2005. We then applied the following restrictions: (1) the 219 
percentage of shareholdings held by controlling shareholders during the sample period was less than 30%; 220 
(2) a firm was excluded if it did not make an announcement on whether it adopted the CVS or not between 221 
2002 and 2005; (3) a firm that adopted the CVS in its IPO year was excluded to ensure that all firms have 222 
data for the years both before and after CVS adoption when we adopt the DID analysis to examine the 223 
effect of CVS adoption in Section 5; (4) a firm was excluded if it adopted the CVS in 2006 as the sample 224 
period is between 2002 and 2005 and we use one-year window when conducting DID analysis; and (5) 225 
a firm/year should not have missing data. 226 
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The above criteria yielded a usable sample of 335 firms (1265 observations), including 129 adopting 227 
firms and 206 non-adopting firms.5 From 2002, the CSRC required listed firms to adopt the CVS when 228 
the shareholding percentage held by controlling shareholders is over 30%. The CVS was incorporated 229 
into the newly amended Corporate Law in 2006. Almost all firms adopted the CVS after the new 230 
Corporate Law became effective from January 1, 2006. 231 
The announcements of CVS adoption are manually collected from articles of associations via 232 
www.sina.com.cn. When selecting sample, we also check whether a firm’s announcement of voluntary 233 
CVS adoption was associated with potentially confounding events, including earnings announcements, 234 
profit distributions, mergers and acquisitions, share issues, related party transactions, asset write-downs, 235 
termination of investment projects, granting managers more decision-making powers. We double-236 
checked the data with www.cninfo.com.cn and the official websites of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 237 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The portfolio composition data of mutual funds and the accounting and share 238 
price data used in this study are obtained from the WIND system and China Stock Market Accounting 239 
Research (CSMAR) system. The data are cross-checked for consistency. 240 
4.2. The research design for the determinants of CVS adoption 241 
To investigate the determinants of CVS adoption, we use the following probit regression model with 242 
a binary dummy CVS adoption as the dependent variable and possible testable variables affecting a firm’s 243 
adoption of the CVS. To mitigate the potential endogeneity of explanatory variables with CVS adoption, 244 
we measure all independent variables in a one-period lag.  245 
                                                        
5 During 2002-2005, 143 firms voluntarily adopted the CVS. Of these firms, 14 firms were excluded as they adopted 
the CVS in their IPO years. Therefore, the number of usable adopting firms in this study is 129. 
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Prob(CVS adoptioni,t=1 | x) = α0 + α1Top1i,t-1 + α2State control i,t-1 + α3Mutual funds’ ownershipi,t-1 + 246 
α4Board independencei,t-1 + α5Dualityi,t-1 + α6Related party transactioni,t-1 247 
+ α7Sanctioni,t-1 + α8Tobin’s Qi,t-1 + α9Leveragei,t-1 + α10Firm sziei,t-1  + 248 
α11CVS imitationi,t-1 + ∑Industry + ∑Year+ εi,t     (1) 249 
where αi represents regression coefficients, ε is an error term. CVS adoption is a dummy variable that 250 
equals 1 when a firm adopts the CVS in year t, 0 otherwise. Following prior studies (e.g., Jiang et al., 251 
2010; Wang, 2015), we include the seven proxies for corporate governance:  252 
Large shareholders (Top 1): Large shareholders who gain effective control of a firm’s management 253 
have greater incentives to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority investors (e.g., Shleifer 254 
and Vishny, 1997). Prior studies in China have reported that large shareholders extract cash through 255 
opportunistic behaviors which greatly harm listed firms’ operations and the benefits of minority 256 
shareholders (e.g., Jiang et al., 2010). Therefore, large shareholders may be more resistant to adopting 257 
the CVS, because the CVS may inhibit them from electing their preferred directors to the board and harm 258 
their interests. Top1 is measured as the proportion of shares owned by the largest shareholder. 259 
State control (State control): State ownership is prevalent as most listed Chinese companies were 260 
previously state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As the ultimate owner, the state has the power to intervene 261 
in the operations of SOEs. However, evidence has been produced that state ownership has not been an 262 
effective governance mechanism in China and it contributes to inefficient monitoring, higher executive 263 
pay, poor operating efficiency, and more acute agency problems (Gul, 1999). We therefore expect that a 264 
firm whose ultimate controlling owner is the state will attempt to maintain state control and be reluctant 265 
to adopt the CVS. State control is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ultimate controlling owner is the 266 
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state, 0 otherwise. 267 
Mutual funds’ ownership (Mutual funds’ ownership): Since 2000, mutual funds have emerged and 268 
rapidly developed in China. Their emergence helps pool the share interests of individuals, strengthens 269 
their bargaining power and monitoring of a firm’s controlling shareholders and their agents (e.g., 270 
managers). Yuan et al. (2008) and Chan et al. (2014) find that mutual funds have played a positive role 271 
in monitoring large shareholders and their agents. However, due to the short history of Chinese capital 272 
market, it is likely that Chinese institutional investors have little power or desire to play their governance 273 
role in firms which they own stocks (Tam, 2002; Jiang and Kim, 2013). Given the mixed evidence, we 274 
do not predict the direction of this variable. Mutual funds’ ownership is measured as the percentage of 275 
common shares in a firm held by mutual funds at year-end. 276 
Board independence (Board independence): Independent directors are considered as an important 277 
corporate governance mechanism to protect the interests of investors, especially minority rights in China 278 
(Wang, 2015). Some recent studies provide evidence that independent directors are effective in China. 279 
For example, independent directors are found to increase bank performance and asset quality (Liang et 280 
al., 2013), protect the interests of outside investors (Tang et al., 2013), and improve internal control 281 
quality (Hu et al., 2017). However, there is also evidence to suggest that they are ineffective. For example, 282 
Liu and Lu (2004) document that independent directors find it difficult to vote against their executive 283 
director friends in China’s guanxi culture. Given the mixed evidence, we do not predict the direction of 284 
this variable. Board independence is measured as the proportion of independent directors on a firm’s 285 
board of directors. 286 
CEO duality (CEO duality): Jensen (1993) argues that Chairman–CEO duality gives the CEO 287 
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excessive power over the decision-making process, plus scope to pursue personal interests at the expense 288 
of shareholders. This duality compromises board independence and weakens its monitoring function 289 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Indeed, Pi and Timme (1993) and Rechner and Dalton (1991) find negative 290 
links between CEO duality and firm performance. However, stewardship theorists argue that CEO duality 291 
encourages the CEO to act in the best interest of the firm and reduce the agency cost of duality 292 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Desai et al., 2003). Supporting this view, Cheung et al. (2006) find that 293 
CEO duality is negatively related to undertaking value-destroying connected transactions. Therefore, we 294 
do not predict the direction of this variable. Duality is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm’s CEO is 295 
also the chairperson of the board, 0 otherwise. 296 
Related party transaction (Related party transaction): In firms with concentrated corporate ownership 297 
structures, controlling shareholders frequently seek to extract private benefits at the expense of minority 298 
shareholders (principal-principal problems) (La Porta et al., 1998). The limited protection of minority 299 
rights and low corporate transparency exacerbates the expropriation of small shareholders (Claessens 300 
and Fan, 2002). Numerous studies show that controlling shareholders often profit from minority 301 
shareholders through related party transactions, particularly in emerging economies with poor protection 302 
of minority shareholders (e.g., Berkman et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2010; Wang, 2015). On the one hand, 303 
as related party transactions are potentially detrimental to a firm’s minority shareholders, firms engaging 304 
in tunneling these transactions are more likely to adopt the CVS as they may be criticized by the CSRC. 305 
On the other hand, because may curb their controlling shareholders’ expropriation, these firms may be 306 
less likely to adopt the CVS. Therefore, we do not predict the direction of this variable. Related party 307 
transaction is dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm engages in related party transactions, 0 otherwise. 308 
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Sanction (Sanction): Prior administrative sanctions by the CSRC and/or stock exchanges indicate 309 
poor corporate governance and thus firms that have incurred such sanctions are under more regulatory 310 
pressure to improve their corporate governance and are more likely to adopt the CVS. Sanction is a 311 
dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has been subject to CSRC disciplinary actions or if the firm has 312 
received reprimands from stock exchanges, 0 otherwise.  313 
In addition, we control for the effect of the following firm characteristics, including firm performance 314 
(Tobin’s Q),6 financial leverage (Leverage), firm size (Firm size), CVS imitation (CVS imitation).7 315 
Finally, we control for the industrial fixed effect and dynamic changes in the macroeconomic 316 
environment common to all firms over the sample period, respectively. All continuous variables are 317 
winsorized at 1% at both tails and all variables are summarized in Appendix.  318 
4.3. The research design for the impact of CVS adoption on firm performance 319 
Recognizing the issue of endogeneity in evaluating the effects of CVS adoption, we control for the 320 
potential endogeneity between CVS adoption and firm performance by comparing a new CVS-adopting 321 
firms (treatment firms) with a sample of matched non-adopting firms (control firms) with the propensity 322 
to adopt the CVS. The primary benefit of using a control sample matched on propensity scores is that it 323 
allows us to more clearly attribute any observed effects to CVS adoption itself, rather than to the firm 324 
characteristics associated with the adoption (Armstrong et al., 2010). 325 
The propensity-score matching proceeds as follows. For each year t with new CVS adoption, 326 
                                                        
6 To be cautious with Tobin’s Q as the proxy for firm performance in a nascent stock market, we use return on assets 
(ROA), return on sales (ROS), and return on investment (ROI) as three alternative performance measures in Section 5 to 
examine the effect of CVS adoption on firm performance. 
7 DiMaggio and Powerll (1983) argue that in situations where a clear course of actions is unavailable, organizational 
leaders may decide to mimic a peer perceived to be successful as response to uncertainty. CVS can be seen as an innovation 
of corporate governance and non-adopting firms will imitate the adopters to adopt the innovation so as to improve their 
competitiveness. 
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we include the new CVS-adopting firms in that year and set the dummy variable NewCVS to one for 327 
these new adopters; we set NewCVS in the same year to zero for firms that never adopt the CVS 328 
over the sample period. This completes the selection of observations for CVS adoption in year t, and 329 
we repeat this procedure for other CVS-adoption years and then pool together all the resulting firm-330 
years. We then estimate a probit model based on this sample. The determinants of CVS adoption are 331 
the same as those in model (1). We conduct covariate imbalance checks by testing whether the means 332 
of the covariates used in model (1) differ between the treatment firms and control firms. 333 
We then use the DID method to ensure that our results are not driven by cross-sectional heterogeneity 334 
between the treatment and control firms as well as common time trends that affect both groups of firms. 335 
We determine one year as the comparing window for DID analysis. Using a short window in DID analysis 336 
has two advantages: (1) the sample, by construction, purposefully focuses on adoption before 2006 to 337 
avoid the confounding effects caused by the Corporate Law in 2006, and (2) using a short window before 338 
and after CVS adoption in DID analysis can help reduce the confounding effects, making sure that the 339 
treatment firms and the matched control firms are comparable; in a longer window, many firm 340 
characteristics can change, especially in the post-adoption years. Finally, our sample includes 129 341 
treatment firms and 129 control firms (258 sample firms in total). The observations in year 0 (the adoption 342 
years) and those with missing data are excluded, remaining 493 observations.  343 
The basic empirical model is as follows: 344 
ROAi,t = β0 + β1NewCVSfirmi,t + β2Posti,t + β3NewCVSfirmi,t×Posti,t +∑ 𝛽q
m
q=4 Control variablesi,t + 345 
Year fixed effects+Industry fixed effects+ε                                  (2) 346 
where Return on assets (ROA) is used to proxy for firm performance, which is measured as the net profit 347 
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divided by year-end total assets. NewCVSfirm is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is a new CVS-348 
adopting firm during 2002-2005 and 0 otherwise. Post is a dummy variable that equals1 if the observation 349 
is after the year of CVS adoption and 0 otherwise. NewCVSfirm×Post is an interaction term to pick up 350 
the changes in the effects of the CVS-adopting firms relative to the matched control firms. The coefficient 351 
on the interaction term (β3) is our estimate of the effects. A significant β3 means that CVS adoption 352 
generates a difference between treatment firms and control firms. Note that if the firm fixed effects are 353 
controlled for, the industry fixed effects will be deleted. 354 
We take into account various factors that could affect firm performance in model (2). Following 355 
prior studies (e.g., Yuan et al., 2008), we include the following control variables: state control (State 356 
control), managerial ownership (Managerial ownership), ownership concentration (Ownership 357 
concentration), financial leverage (Leverage), the percentage of tangible assets (Tangibility), and firm 358 
size (Firm size). All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% at both tails and all variables are 359 
summarized in Appendix.  360 
5. Empirical analyses 361 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 362 
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in model (1) are reported in Panel A of Table 1. As Panel 363 
A shows, 16.2% of firm/year observations adopted the CVS over the period of 2002-2005. The average 364 
percentage of shareholdings held by the largest shareholders is 23.9%. 50.8% of sample firms are 365 
ultimately controlled by the government. Mutual funds’ ownership is relatively low, only accounting for 366 
1.0% of the total number of shares in issue though it can be as high as 29.1% in some firms.  367 
Panel A also presents that on average, 24.9% of board members are independent directors during 368 
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2001-2004, ranging from 0 to 55.6%. This is reasonable as the CSRC did not enact a formal, 369 
comprehensive guideline on independent directors of domestically listed firms until 2001. The 370 
regulations stipulated that boards must have at least two independent directors by 30 June 2002, and at 371 
least one-third of the board members should be independent directors by 30 June 2003. In 14.2% of firms 372 
CEOs and board chairmen are the same person, 84.4% of firm/year observations engage in related party 373 
transactions, 5.1% of sample firms have been subject to the CSRC disciplinary sanctions or received 374 
reprimands from stock exchanges. The firms in our sample have an average Tobin’s Q of 2.450, an 375 
average leverage of 0.529, an average size of 20.832, and the cumulative percentage of firms adopting 376 
the CVS in the same province is 0.085. 377 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 378 
5.2. Correlation analysis 379 
Table 2 reports the calculated Pearson correlation coefficients between variables in mode (1). CVS 380 
adoption is positively and significantly correlated with Mutual funds’ ownership, Board independence, 381 
and CVS imitation, while negatively and significantly related to state control and Tobin’s Q. Table 2 also 382 
shows that all the correlations between the independent variables are relatively low.  383 
To further test the existence of multicollinearity, we compute the variance inflation factor (VIF) for 384 
independent variables and the largest is 1.84, well below the rule-of-thumb cutoff of 10.0 for multiple 385 
regression models (Kennedy, 1998). Thus, we conclude that multicollinearity is probably not a serious 386 
problem in our study. 387 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 388 
5.3. Multivariate Results on the determinants of CVS adoption 389 
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Table 3 reports the results of mode (1). As shown in Table 3, the coefficient on Mutual funds’ 390 
ownership is positive and significant, which suggests that when a firm has a greater proportion of 391 
ownership held by mutual funds, it is more likely to adopt the CVS. This supports previous evidence that 392 
mutual funds can play an important governance role in monitoring controlling shareholders and their 393 
agents in China where a central agency problem is the principal-principal problems (Yuan et al., 2008). 394 
CVS adoption is positively and significantly associated with board independence, indicating that 395 
independent directors are an important corporate governance mechanism to protect the interests of 396 
investors, especially minority rights in China.  397 
In summary, the results are consistent with H1b that firms with strong corporate governance are more 398 
likely to adopt the CVS.  399 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 400 
5.4. The regression results on the impact of CVS adoption on firm performance 401 
Based on the probit estimation, for each new ERP-adopter in a year, we select a non-adopter with 402 
the closest propensity score in the same year as the matched control firm. To confirm whether the 403 
matching is satisfactory, we check the covariate balance by comparing the means of the covariates used 404 
in matching and report the results in Table 4. As Table 4 shows, there is no significant difference in the 405 
means of any of the covariates between treatment and control firms, indicating that the propensity-score 406 
matched sample firms resemble the CVS-adopting firms along virtually all dimensions. In general, the 407 
results suggest that in comparing the CVS-adopting firms to control firms, we effectively control for the 408 
potential endogeneity linking CVS adoption and firm performance. Finally, we have 129 CVS-adopting 409 
firms during 2002-2005 and they are matched with 129 control firms.  410 
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<Insert Table 4 about here> 411 
The regression results of model (2) are reported in Table 5. After controlling for firm fixed effects, 412 
we find that the coefficient on NewCVSfirm×Post in Column (1) remains positive and significant at the 413 
5% level (t＝2.01). The finding indicates that the CVS-adopting firms outperform the control firms. Our 414 
hypothesis (H2) is supported. 415 
To further substantiate our hypothesis, we use return on sales (ROS) and return on investment (ROI) 416 
as alternative measures of firm performance. We calculate ROS as net profit divided by sales and ROI as 417 
net profit divided by investment. The results, reported in Columns (2)-(3) of Table 5, are qualitatively 418 
unchanged. 419 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 420 
6. Heterogeneities in the effect of CVS adoption on firm performance 421 
As discussed above, CVS provides minority shareholder protection through voting and hence it is an 422 
effective governance mechanism. Accordingly, we predict that the positive association between CVS 423 
adoption and firm performance is more pronounced for firms with less monitoring. In this section, we 424 
examine the moderating effects of mutual funds’ ownership, firm information environment, and 425 
managerial power, using the following model: 426 
ROAi,t =θ0+θ1CVS adoption i,t +∑ 𝜃q
m
q=2 Control variablesi,t+Year fixed effects 427 
+Firm fixed effects +ε                                            (3) 428 
where θi represents regression coefficients, ε is an error term. CVS adoption is a dummy variable that 429 
equals 1 when a firm adopts the CVS, 0 otherwise. The control variables are the same as those in model 430 
(2). We use the sample of 129 treatment firms and control firms (258 firms in total) to examine the 431 
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moderating effects. All the variables are defined in Appendix.  432 
6.1. The moderating effect of firm information environment 433 
A strong information environment means low information asymmetry (Liao et al., 2018), hence 434 
resulting in lower agency problems. As the CVS tends to alleviate principal-principal problems in firms 435 
with concentrated ownership structures, we accordingly posit that the effect of CVS adoption on firm 436 
performance is more pronounced for firms in a weak information environment.  437 
As financial analysts can reduce information asymmetry (He and Tian, 2013), we use the number of 438 
financial analysts following a firm (Analysts) to measure the quality of firm information environment. 439 
More analysts indicate a stronger information environment.  440 
We divide the sample into two subsets: the subset in strong information environment with the number 441 
of financial analysts above the median of the same year and industry, and the subset weak information 442 
environment with the number of financial analysts below the median. We re-estimate model (3) with the 443 
two subsets separately. The results are reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. As we expected, the 444 
coefficient on CVS adoption for firms in weak information environment in Column (1) is positive and 445 
significant at the 1% level, while it is not significant for firms in strong information environment in 446 
Column (2). A test of the difference in regression coefficients on CVS adoption generates a p-value of 447 
0.069 (two-tailed) between Columns (1) and (2). The result indicates that a strong firm information 448 
environment mitigates the impact of CVS adoption on firm performance. 449 
6.2. The moderating effect of mutual funds’ ownership 450 
As we discuss above, mutual funds help pool the share interests of individuals, strengthens their 451 
bargaining power and provides monitoring of a firm’s controlling shareholders and their agents (e.g., 452 
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managers), therefore we predict that the effect of CVS adoption on firm performance is more pronounced 453 
for firms with lower mutual funds’ ownership.  454 
We divide the sample into two subsets: the subset with higher mutual funds’ ownership with the 455 
ownership above the median of the same year and industry, and the subset with lower ownership with 456 
the ownership below the median. We re-estimate model (3) with the two subsets separately. The results 457 
are reported in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6. As we expected, the coefficient on CVS adoption for 458 
firms with lower mutual funds’ ownership in Column (3) is positive and significant at the 1% level, while 459 
it is not significant for firms with higher ownership in Column (4). A test of the difference in regression 460 
coefficients on CVS adoption generates a p-value of 0.001 (two-tailed) between Columns (3) and (4). 461 
The result indicates that the impact of CVS adoption on firm performance is more pronounced for firms 462 
with lower mutual funds’ ownership. 463 
6.3. The moderating effect of managerial power 464 
Jensen (1993) argues that Chairman–CEO duality provides the CEO with excessive power over the 465 
decision-making process and the scope to pursue personal interests at the expense of shareholders. This 466 
duality compromises board independence and weakens its monitoring function (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 467 
In a similar vein, Lasfer (2006) argues that through their shareholdings, managers entrench their position 468 
and weaken the monitoring power of a board. In a word, managers with more power tend to shield from 469 
the monitoring from the board. Therefore, we predict that the perceived relationship between CVS 470 
adoption and firm performance is more pronounced for firms with higher managerial power. 471 
Following Hu et al. (2017), we use the principal components analysis (PCA) to construct an index to 472 
represent managerial power. Following Hu and Kumar (2004) and considering China’s practice, we 473 
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include five proxies for managerial power, i.e., ownership concentration, managerial ownership, duality, 474 
board size, and board independence. We retain the first factor that explains 87.6% of the five variables 475 
and use it to proxy for managerial power. A higher value of the index indicates higher managerial power. 476 
We divide the sample into two subsets: the higher power subset with the power index above the 477 
median of the same year and industry, and the lower power subset with the power index below the median. 478 
We re-estimate model (3) with the two subsets separately. The results are reported in Columns (5) and 479 
(6) of Table 6. As we expected, the coefficient on CVS adoption for firms with higher managerial power 480 
in Column (6) is positive and significant at the 5% level, while it is not significant for firms with lower 481 
managerial power in Column (5). A test of the difference in regression coefficients on CVS adoption 482 
generates a p-value of 0.007 (two-tailed) between Columns (3) and (4). The result indicates that the 483 
positive impact of CVS adoption on firm performance is more significant for firms with high managerial 484 
power.  485 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 486 
Taken the above together, we find that the positive relationship between CVS adoption and firm 487 
performance becomes more significant for firms in a weak firm information environment, with less 488 
mutual funds’ ownership, and whose mangers have more power.8  489 
7. Channels through which CVS adoption affects firm performance 490 
Our evidence suggests that firms adopting the CVS tend to have better performance, as can be seen 491 
from an improved ROA in Section 5. In this section, we seek to identify the channels through which CVS 492 
                                                        
8 These heterogeneities found in the cross-sectional analysis also help lessen the concern that the positive effect of 
CVS adoption on firm performance is purely driven by endogeneity (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  
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adoption could affect firm performance. We explore three possibilities: (1) whether CVS adoption 493 
increases the number of board directors with professional experience, (2) whether CVS adoption reduces 494 
controlling shareholders’ expropriation, and (3) whether CVS adoption reduces managerial entrenchment. 495 
The professionalism of board directors may improve firm performance, while controlling shareholders’ 496 
expropriation and managerial entrenchment may decrease firm performance, therefore, these three 497 
factors could be viable channels by which CVS adoption affects firm performance. 498 
7.1 CVS adoption and the professionalism of board directors  499 
Since CVS is mainly used to select board directors, CV adoption may result in the selection of  more 500 
directors with professional experience to a firm’s board and an improvement on the professionalism of 501 
board directors. As directors’ professional experience helps them perform their monitoring and advisory 502 
roles better, increased board professionalism should lead to improved increasing firm performance (e.g., 503 
Adams et al., 2018; Drobetz et al., 2018). 504 
We now test whether CVS adoption increases the professionalism of board directors. The dependent 505 
variable Professionalism is measured by the proportion of directors with professional experience in a 506 
firm’s board of directors. Following Chen and Du (2015), we consider that a director has professional 507 
experience if he/she is a(n) economist, lawyer, and accountant, etc. Following Yuan and Wen (2018), we 508 
include the following control variables in the model: state control (State control), the shareholding of the 509 
largest shareholder (Top1), shareholdings held by mutual funds (Mutual funds’ ownership), board size 510 
(Board size), board independence (Board independence), sales growth (Sales growth), return on assets 511 
(ROA), firm size (Firm size), and financial leverage (Leverage). We also control for year fixed effects 512 
and firm fixed effects. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% at both tails and all variables are 513 
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summarized in Appendix. The results are reported in Table 7.  514 
The results in Column (2) show that the coefficient on CVS adoption is positive and significant at the 515 
1% level. This indicates that CVS adoption increases the proportion of directors with professional 516 
experience and improves the professionalism of board directors, hence leading to better performance.  517 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 518 
7.2. CVS adoption and controlling shareholders’ expropriation 519 
As we discuss above, CVS adoption protects the interests of minority shareholders by increasing the 520 
representation of minority shareholders in a board and mitigates controlling shareholders’ expropriation. 521 
Therefore, we predict a negative association between CVS adoption and controlling shareholders’ 522 
expropriation. Meanwhile, controlling shareholders’ expropriation damages firm value (e.g., Lei and 523 
Song, 2011). 524 
We now examine whether CVS adoption alleviate controlling shareholders’ expropriation. Jiang et 525 
al. (2010) use inter-corporate lending used by controlling shareholders to measure the expropriation, 526 
which is reported as part of “Other Receivables” in annual reports, Wang and Xiao (2011) adopt the 527 
amount of cash transferred from listed companies to their controlling shareholders as another proxy of 528 
the expropriation, which is also disclosed in “Other Receivables”. Hence, we use the ratio of the amount 529 
of other receivables to total assets (Tunneling) to measure controlling shareholders’ expropriation. 530 
We include the following control variables in the model: state control (State control), the shareholding 531 
of the largest shareholder (Top1), board size (Board size), board independence (Board independence), 532 
firm size (Firm size), return on assets (ROA), and financial leverage (Leverage). We also control for the 533 
year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% at both tails and 534 
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all variables are summarized in Appendix. The results are reported in Table 8.  535 
The results in Column (2) show that the coefficient on CVS adoption is negative and significant at 536 
the 5% level (t=-2.11). This indicates that CVS adoption mitigates controlling shareholders’ 537 
expropriation, hence resulting in higher firm value.  538 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 539 
7.3. CVS adoption and managerial entrenchment  540 
Based on the agency theory, managers tend to expropriate shareholders by diverting corporate 541 
resources for perquisites and empire building at the expense of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 542 
Jensen, 1989). This agency conflict between shareholders and managers becomes more intense when 543 
corporate management are entrenched (Pan, 2007).  544 
As we discuss above, CVS adoption is one of effective corporate governance mechanisms and 545 
perceived to protect the interests of shareholders, especially minority shareholders. Therefore, we predict 546 
a negative association between CVS adoption and managerial entrenchment. Meanwhile, managerial 547 
entrenchment curtails shareholders’ wealth (Jensen, 1986; Pan, 2007). 548 
We now examine whether CVS adoption curbs managerial entrenchment. As perks may be created 549 
by managers to divert resources from the firm for their own private benefit (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 550 
Yermack, 2006), we use abnormal perks as a proxy of managerial entrenchment. Following Gul et al. 551 
(2011), we read through the notes to the section of “other cash flows related to operating activities” in 552 
the statements of cash flows; for each firm, we manually collect the six items of perk expenses data.9 553 
                                                        
9 The six items of perk expenses include expenses relating to traveling, business entertainment, overseas training, board 
meetings, company cars, and other meetings. 
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We add the six items together to get a firm’s overall perk expenses and then standardize a firm’s overall 554 
perk expenses by its sales (Perks/Sales). Finally, following Gul et al. (2011) and Xu et al. (2014), we 555 
employ the residuals from the following model to generate the abnormal perks (abPerks6), our main 556 
variable of interest.  557 
    Perks/Sales i,t =γ0+γ1LnCompensationi,t +γ2Lnassetsi,t++γ3Lnincomepercapitai,t +ε         (4) 558 
where Perks/Sales is ratio of the sum of the six items of perk expenses divided by sales, Lncompensation 559 
is the natural logarithm of total compensation for all firm employees, LnAsset is the natural logarithm of 560 
the book value of total assets, and Lnincomepercapita is the natural logarithm of total income per capita 561 
of the region in which a firm is located. We run the regressions of model (4), the residuals are our main 562 
variable, abPerks6.10 563 
We include the following variables in the model which may affect managerial entrenchment: state 564 
control (State control), power balance (Power balance), the percentage of A shares (A share), 565 
shareholdings held by mutual funds (Mutual funds’ ownership), board independence (Board 566 
independence), return on assets (ROA), firm size (Firm size), and financial leverage (Leverage). We 567 
control for year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% at both 568 
tails and all variables are summarized in Appendix. The results are reported in Columns (1)-(2) of Table 569 
9.  570 
The results show that the coefficient on CVS adoption is negative and significant at the 5% level (t=-571 
2.57). This indicates that CVS adoption reduces managerial entrenchment, hence resulting in higher firm 572 
                                                        
10 In addition to the six items of perk expenses in Note 8, work-related expenses and communication expenses may 
also be perk expenses. We use the eight items of perk expenses to generate an alternative abnormal perks (abPerks8). 
Using abPerks8 as the dependent variable, we examine the impact of CVS adoption on abnormal perks and obtain results 
similar to those in Columns (1)-(2) of Table 9. The results are reported in Columns (3)-(4) of Table 9.  
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value.  573 
<Insert Table 9 about here> 574 
In sum, these results bolster our findings and help explain the link between CVS adoption and firm 575 
performance. CVS adoption appears to be associated with more directors with professional experience, 576 
less expropriation by controlling shareholders, and less managerial entrenchment. 577 
8. Conclusions  578 
In 2002, the CSRC required listed firms to adopt the CVS when over 30% of their total number of 579 
shares were held by controlling shareholders, with the aim of improving fair minority representation and 580 
protecting minority interests. However, 129 firms voluntarily adopted the CVS during 2002-2005, even 581 
though they did not meet the shareholding requirement. This study examines why these firms voluntarily 582 
adopted the CVS and whether CVS adoption affects firm performance.  583 
Using this unique sample over the period 2002-2005, we find that firms with strong corporate 584 
governance are more likely to voluntarily adopt the CVS and CVS adoption improves firm performance. 585 
Further analyses show that the positive relationship between CVS adoption and firm performance is more 586 
significant for firms in a weak firm information environment, with less mutual funds’ ownership, and 587 
whose mangers have more power. Finally, we find three channels – the professionalism of board directors, 588 
controlling shareholders’ expropriation, and managerial entrenchment - through which CVS adoption 589 
affects firm performance. 590 
Our study enriches the literature on corporate governance in general and on the principal-principal 591 
problems in particular. It also has important policy implications. First, our findings suggest that in 592 
countries where ownership is concentrated, CVS adoption is a useful way to protect the interests of 593 
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minority shareholders, because it reduces controlling shareholders’ expropriation and managerial 594 
entrenchment. Second, in China, a further reduction of the influence of controlling shareholders over 595 
listed firms could be considered so as to limit the expropriation by controlling shareholders, thus 596 
improving investor protection.  597 
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Appendix  617 
Variable definitions  618 
 619 
Variables Definitions 
Variables in probit model (1) 
CVS adoption 
 
A dummy variable that equals one if a firm adopts the cumulative 
voting system (CVS) in year t and zero otherwise 
Top1 The proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder  
State control  A dummy variable that equals one if the ultimate controlling 
shareholder of a listed firm is the state in year t and zero otherwise 
Mutual funds’ ownership A firm’s percentage of common shares held by mutual funds as of 
year-end 
Board independence The proportion of independent directors on a firm’s board of directors  
Duality A dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s CEO is also the 
chairperson of the board and zero otherwise 
Related party transaction A dummy variable that equals one if a firm engages in related party 
transactions and zero otherwise 
Sanction A dummy variable that equals one if a firm has been subject to the 
CSRC disciplinary sanctions, or a firm received reprimands from stock 
exchanges in year t and zero otherwise 
Tobin’s Q The sum of the market value of equity and book value of total liabilities 
divided by book value of total assets. The market values of A and B 
shares are calculated based on the year-end share price 
Leverage Total liabilities divided by total assets  
Firm size The natural logarithm of book value of total assets  
CVS imitation Cumulative percentage of firms adopting the CVS in the same 
province as of year-end 
Variables in DID model (2) 
Return on assets (ROA) 
Return on sales (ROS) 
Return on investment (ROI) 
Managerial ownership 
 
Ownership concentration 
 
Tangibility 
NewCVSfirm 
 
Net profit divided by year-end total assets 
Net profit divided by sales 
Net profit divided by investment 
The percentage of common shares owned by managers and directors 
as of year-end 
The sum of squared percentage of shares held by the top five 
shareholders 
The sum of net fixed assets and inventory divided by total assets 
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Post 
 
Other variables 
Analysts 
 
Managerial power 
 
 
Professionalism 
 
 
 
Tunneling 
 
abPerks6 
 
 
abPerks8 
 
 
Board size 
Power balance 
 
 
Sales growth 
A dummy variable that equals one if a firm is a new CVS-adopting 
firm during 2002-2005 and zero otherwise 
A dummy variable that equals one if the observation is after the year 
of CVS adoption and zero otherwise 
 
A proxy for information environment. It is the number of financial 
analysts following a firm 
An index to measure managerial power. We use the principal 
components analysis (PCA) to construct this index. Please see Section 
6.3 for detail  
A proxy for the professionalism of board directors. It is the proportion 
of directors with professional experience in a firm’s board of directors. 
We consider that a director has professional experience if he/she is a(n) 
economist, lawyer, and accountant, etc 
A proxy for controlling shareholders’ expropriation. It is the ratio of 
other receivables divided by total assets  
A proxy for managerial entrenchment. It is abnormal perks expenses, 
the residuals estimated from model (4) using six items of perk 
expenses. Please see section 7.2 for detail  
A proxy for managerial entrenchment. It is abnormal perks expenses, 
the residuals estimated from model (4) using eight items of perk 
expenses. Please see Footnote No. 11 for detail 
The number of directors in a firm’s board of directors 
The natural logarithm of the ratio of the number of shares held by the 
largest shareholder divided by the sum of the number of shares held 
by the second to the fifth largest shareholders 
The increased percentage of sales   
A share A firm’s proportion of tradable A-shares as of year-end 
 620 
This table contains the definitions of variables used in our analysis. All continuous variables are 621 
winsorized at 1% at both tails. 622 
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 760 
Table 1  761 
Descriptive statistics 762 
 763 
Panel A: The variables in the probit model (1) 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
CVS adoption  1265 0.162  0.000  0.369  0.000  1.000  
Top1 1265 0.239  0.250  0.060  0.089  0.624  
State control  1265 0.508  1.000  0.500  0.000  1.000  
Mutual funds’ ownership  1265 0.010  0.000  0.029  0.000  0.291  
Board independence  1265 0.249  0.308  0.136  0.000  0.556  
Duality  1265 0.142  0.000  0.349  0.000  1.000  
Related party transaction  1265 0.844  1.000  0.363  0.000  1.000  
Sanction  1265 0.051  0.000  0.221  0.000  1.000  
Tobin’s Q  1265 2.450  1.950  1.650  0.907  12.755  
Leverage  1265 0.529  0.522  0.244  0.050  1.501  
Firm size  1265 20.832  20.851  0.847  18.918  23.955  
CVS imitation  1265 0.085  0.026  0.122  0.000  0.500  
Panel B: Main variables in the performance model (2) 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
Return on assets  493 0.002  0.019  0.091  -0.326  0.204  
Return on sales 493 -1.709  0.275  8.745  -36.338  6.361  
Return on investment 493 -0.073  0.037  0.447  -1.892  0.682  
State control  493 0.513  1.000  0.500  0.000  1.000  
Managerial ownership  493 0.024  0.000  0.102  0.000  0.748  
Ownership concentration  493 0.083  0.078  0.042  0.014  0.331  
Leverage  493 0.568  0.548  0.283  0.050  1.501  
Tangibility  493 0.442  0.448  0.177  0.016  0.838  
Firm size  493 20.875  20.865  0.948  18.918  23.855  
 764 
This table reports the summary statistics of the main variables defined in Appendix and used in 765 
subsequent analyses. Panel A shows the summary statistics of the variables used in probit model (1) and 766 
Panel B shows the summary statistics of the main variables for performance model (2). Except for the 767 
variable of CVS adoption that is manually collected, the other variables are extracted from the CSMAR 768 
database and Wind system. 769 
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Table 2  770 
Correlation coefficients  771 
 772 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)   
CVS adoption  1            
Top1  -0.028 1           
State control  -0.047* -0.024 1          
Mutual funds’ ownership 0.125*** -0.116*** -0.025 1         
Board independence  0.231*** -0.089*** -0.080*** 0.054* 1        
Duality  0.012 -0.005 -0.081*** -0.046 -0.017 1       
Related party transaction  0.035 0.048* 0.091*** -0.001 0.029 -0.038 1      
Sanction  0.005 0.015 -0.079*** -0.025 -0.012 0.008 -0.009 1     
Tobin’s Q  -0.144*** 0.102*** -0.127*** -0.086*** -0.256*** 0.024 -0.107*** 0.036 1    
Leverage  -0.003 -0.017 -0.123*** -0.136*** 0.105*** 0.042 -0.042 0.132*** 0.165*** 1   
Firm size  0.023 -0.182*** 0.105*** 0.231*** 0.085*** -0.014 0.119*** -0.071** -0.605*** -0.057** 1  
CVS imitation  0.471*** -0.011 -0.029 0.139*** 0.339*** 0.012 0.060** 0.049* -0.184*** 0.100*** 0.048* 1 
 773 
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients on main variables defined in Appendix and used in probit model (1). *, **, ***: statistically 774 
significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. 775 
 776 
 777 
 778 
 779 
 780 
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Table 3  781 
The determinants of CVS adoption: Pobit regressions 782 
 783 
 784 
This table reports the probit results from regressing CVS adoption on one-period lagged determinants. 785 
The variables are defined in Appendix. t-statistics in the brackets are based on standard errors adjusted 786 
for clustering at the firm level. The coefficients on the constant, year and industry fixed effects are 787 
omitted for brevity. *, **, ***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level 788 
(two-tailed), respectively. 789 
 790 
 791 
 792 
 793 
Prob(CVS adoption=1) (1)  (2) (3) 
Top1  -0.045 -0.016 -0.501 
 (-0.04) (-0.01) (-0.42) 
State control  -0.145 -0.126 -0.114 
 (-1.02) (-0.86) (-0.78) 
Mutual funds’ ownership  3.293** 3.439** 3.453** 
 (2.15) (2.20) (2.07) 
Board independence   1.329** 1.282* 
  (2.01) (1.86) 
Duality   0.142 0.064 
  (0.79) (0.37) 
Related party transaction   0.108 0.072 
  (0.66) (0.42) 
Sanction   -0.171 -0.152 
  (-0.79) (-0.62) 
Tobin’s Q    -0.152** 
   (-2.31) 
Leverage    -0.485* 
   (-1.65) 
Firm size    -0.196* 
   (-1.79) 
CVS imitation    4.184*** 
   (7.40) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 1265 1265 1265 
Pseudo R2 0.176 0.182  0.279 
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Table 4 794 
The results of covariate balance checks 795 
 796 
 
Means 
t values 
CC    NewCVS=1 NewCVS=0 
Top1 0.233 0.238 -0.66 
State control 0.500 0.523 -0.37 
Mutual funds’ ownership 0.019 0.015 0.69 
Board independence  0.310 0.317 -0.52 
Duality 0.164 0.148 0.34 
Related party transaction 0.875 0.844 0.72 
Sanction 0.055 0.047 0.28 
Tobin’s Q 1.988 2.131 -0.82 
Leverage 0.523 0.553 -0.96 
Firm size 20.870 20.801 0.61 
CVS imitation 0.209 0.191 1.09 
 797 
This table reports the results of covariate balance checks (pstest) on the mean difference in the covariates 798 
used in the probit model between the CVS-adopting firms and the matched control firms, when 799 
propensity score matching is adopted. All the variables are one-year lagged and defined in Appendix. 800 
 801 
 802 
 803 
 804 
 805 
 806 
 807 
 808 
 809 
 810 
 811 
 812 
 813 
 814 
 815 
 816 
 817 
 818 
 819 
 820 
 821 
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Table 5  822 
The effect of CVS adoption on firm performance: DID analysis 823 
 824 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
ROA ROS ROI 
NewCVSfirm×Post  0.025** 0.180*** 2.811** 
 (2.01) (2.86) (2.03) 
State control 0.017 0.127 -0.522 
 (0.74) (1.08) (-0.17) 
Managerial ownership 0.168 0.635 15.928 
 (1.26) (1.36) (1.58) 
Ownership concentration  0.211 0.365 1.690 
 (1.61) (0.53) (0.12) 
Leverage -0.124*** -0.659*** -11.543** 
 (-2.71) (-2.64) (-2.10) 
Tangibility 0.003 -0.144 2.221 
 (0.05) (-0.43) (0.30) 
Firm size 0.008 0.070 -1.644 
 (0.49) (0.76) (-0.72) 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 493 493 493 
R-squared 0.106 0.142 0.068 
 825 
This table reports the difference-in-difference results regarding the effect of CVS adoption on firm 826 
performance. The matched control sample is identified by using propensity score matching. We then use 827 
the difference-in-difference method to compare firm performance in one year before and after the CVS 828 
adoption year of the treatment firms. t-statistics in the brackets are based on standard errors adjusted for 829 
clustering at the firm level. The coefficients on the constant, and year and firm fixed effects are omitted 830 
for brevity. *, **, ***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level (two-831 
tailed), respectively. 832 
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Table 6 833 
The moderating effects of firm information environment, mutual funds’ ownership, and managerial power  834 
 835 
 (1)                (2) (3)                (4) (5)  (6) 
 
Less  
Analysts 
More  
Analysts 
Lower mutual  
funds’ ownership 
Higher mutual 
funds’ ownership  
Lower  
managerial power 
Higher  
managerial power 
CVS adoption  0.032*** -0.003 0.041*** -0.017 0.003 0.035** 
 (2.65) (-0.40) (3.34) (-1.47) (0.24) (2.59) 
State control 0.005 0.014 0.004 0.008 -0.000 0.023 
 (0.27) (0.90) (0.19) (0.39) (-0.02) (0.83) 
Managerial ownership 0.123 0.215 0.117 0.330   
 (0.48) (1.40) (0.48) (1.28)   
Ownership concentration  0.268 0.190 0.285 0.077 0.126 0.304 
 (1.44) (1.45) (1.40) (0.46) (0.65) (1.38) 
Leverage -0.158*** 0.058* -0.157*** -0.103** -0.143*** -0.183*** 
 (-5.47) (1.88) (-5.27) (-2.60) (-4.21) (-5.25) 
Tangibility 0.026 0.002 0.010 0.038 0.035 0.020 
 (0.63) (0.05) (0.23) (0.64) (0.71) (0.41) 
Firm size 0.017 -0.032*** 0.002 0.026* 0.010 -0.008 
 (1.06) (-2.77) (0.15) (1.78) (0.61) (-0.45) 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 357 136 317 176 273 231 
R-squared 0.142 0.087 0.111 0.060 0.067 0.147 
P value of test of difference  0.003* 0.001*** 0.080*** 
 836 
This table reports the results regarding the moderating effects of firm information environment, mutual funds’ ownership, and managerial power on 837 
the association between CVS adoption and firm performance. The dependent variable is ROA. The variables are defined in Appendix. t-statistics in 838 
the brackets are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The coefficients on the constant, year and firm fixed effects are 839 
omitted for brevity. *, **, ***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. 840 
  
42 
Table 7  841 
CVS adoption and the professionalism of board directors  842 
 843 
 844 
This 845 
table 846 
reports the results regarding the relationship between CVS adoption and the professionalism of board 847 
directors. Professionalism is a proxy for the professionalism of board directors. The variables are defined 848 
in Appendix. t-statistics in the brackets are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm 849 
level. The coefficients on the constant, year and firm fixed effects are omitted for brevity. *, **, ***: 850 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. 851 
 852 
 853 
 854 
 855 
 856 
 Professionalism 
 (1) (2) 
CVS adoption 0.060*** 0.066*** 
 (2.61) (2.73) 
State control 0.039 0.043 
 (0.84) (0.92) 
Top1 -0.330* -0.331* 
 (-1.69) (-1.86) 
Mutual funds’ ownership -0.085 -0.166 
 (-0.51) (-0.91) 
Board size -0.039*** -0.040*** 
 (-4.04) (-3.85) 
Board independence -0.010 0.299 
 (-0.03) (1.05) 
Sales growth  0.002 
  (1.52) 
ROA  -0.013 
  (-0.07) 
Firm size  0.035 
  (0.89) 
Leverage  -0.266*** 
  (-3.04) 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
N 501 480 
R-squared 0.200 0.284 
  
43 
Table 8  857 
CVS adoption and controlling shareholders’ expropriation 858 
 859 
 Tunneling 
 (1) (2) 
CVS adoption -0.170 -0.150** 
 (-1.53) (-2.11) 
State control -0.138 0.029 
 (-1.16) (0.39) 
Top1 -1.067 -0.887 
 (-0.83) (-0.89) 
Board size -0.012 -0.033* 
 (-0.69) (-1.96) 
Board independence -0.146 -0.816* 
 (-0.27) (-1.75) 
Firm size  0.148 
  (1.08) 
Tobin’s Q  0.401*** 
  (3.04) 
Leverage   0.210 
  (0.72) 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
N 501 488 
R-squared 0.034 0.548 
 860 
This table reports the results regarding the relationship between CVS adoption and controlling 861 
shareholders’ expropriation, between CVS adoption and managerial entrenchment. Tunneling is a proxy 862 
for the expropriation. The variables are defined in Appendix. t-statistics in the brackets are based on 863 
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The coefficients on the constant, year and firm 864 
fixed effects are omitted for brevity. *, **, ***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 865 
0.05 and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. 866 
 867 
 868 
 869 
 870 
 871 
 872 
 873 
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Table 9 874 
CVS adoption and managerial entrenchment 875 
 876 
 abPerks6 abPerks8 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CVS adoption -0.020*** -0.020** -0.028*** -0.025*** 
 (-2.81) (-2.57) (-2.87) (-2.73) 
State control -0.010** -0.010* -0.011** -0.009 
 (-2.02) (-1.74) (-2.13) (-1.20) 
Power balance -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.32) (-0.24) (-0.02) (-0.02) 
A share -0.189 -0.194 -0.175 -0.194 
 (-1.41) (-1.47) (-1.27) (-1.42) 
Mutual funds’ ownership 0.038 0.045 -0.001 0.019 
 (0.60) (0.71) (-0.01) (0.24) 
Board independence -0.025 -0.033 -0.036 -0.053 
 (-0.91) (-1.09) (-0.87) (-1.00) 
ROA  -0.045  -0.137 
  (-1.57)  (-1.49) 
Firm size  -0.003  0.005 
  (-0.27)  (0.40) 
Leverage  -0.009  0.009 
  (-0.33)  (0.27) 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 424 424 424 424 
R-squared 0.082 0.087 0.062 0.090 
 877 
This table reports the results regarding the relationship between CVS adoption and managerial 878 
entrenchment. abPerks is a proxy for managerial entrenchment. The variables are defined in Appendix. 879 
t-statistics in the brackets are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The 880 
coefficients on the constant, year and firm fixed effects are omitted for brevity. *, **, ***: statistically 881 
significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. 882 
